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Confronting Lord Haw–Haw: Rumour and Britain’s Wartime Anti-Lies Bureau 
 
On 30 May 1940, Sidney House, a 54-year-old clerk at the Mansfield labour 
exchange, reported to the police that, three days earlier, he heard the German 
radio propagandist Lord Haw-Haw threaten the occupation of local schools by 
German troops.  The authorities set about verifying House’s account.  The BBC 
Monitoring Service, which screened all foreign radio programmes throughout the 
Second World War, checked its transcriptions of German broadcasts. No such 
threat was issued by the infamous radio announcer. The police interviewed House 
again, this time warning him of the potential consequences of a false statement 
under the General Regulations of the 1939 Defence Act. House confessed that he 
did not personally hear the broadcast; instead he had ‘overheard some people 
talking about it as they passed my garden’. When pressed, House admitted that he 
had invoked Haw-Haw’s name in order to give his story force and legitimacy: ‘it 
would have had more effect than if I heard it from someone else’.  Asserting his 
patriotic credentials as a ‘Britisher’, House pleaded that he did not ‘intend to harm 
anyone’. His pleas fell on deaf ears. House was charged with ‘unlawfully making a 
statement which he knew to be false’ and stood trial at Mansfield Magistrates 
Court in June 1940. 1 The case was the first relating to Haw-Haw broadcasts to be 
prosecuted under the provision about false statements within the Defence 
Regulations.  
The prosecuting counsel focused on the proliferation of rumours generated 
by House’s statement and the potential damage to public morale. Cecil de 
Sausmarez, a representative of Britain’s Ministry of Information (MoI), presented 
evidence from the BBC Monitoring Service, and reported on the ‘enormous 
number of such rumours’ that had been swamping the Ministry. R.P. Marchant, for 
the prosecution, declared that ‘unfounded rumours are much too prevalent 
throughout the country at the moment’. House was found guilty and issued with a 
£10 fine and five guineas costs to be settled within one month. The presiding 
magistrate, Mr G. Annable, expressed the ‘hope that this will be a warning to 
everybody’. The Ministry of Information seized upon Annable’s invitation and 
                                                        
1 The Defence (General) Regulations, vol. 1, 1939, 13th edition (HMSO, 1943).   
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issued a leaflet on House’s case (Figure 1), while local and national press carried 
news of the trial.2  
                                       
Figure 1: MoI publicity on prosecutions for spreading Haw-Haw rumours, 6 June 1940. 
 
News of House’s conviction broke on 6 June 1940, shortly after the 
completion of the British Expeditionary Force’s evacuation from Dunkirk. Indeed, 
House shared the front page of the Daily Mirror with news from the Picardy 
beaches.  At such a critical moment in the war, with the imminent fall of France 
                                                        
2 False Story of “Lord Haw-Haw” broadcast’, Dundee Courier and Advertiser, 6 
June 1940, p. 4;  ‘Mansfield Clerk taught a sharp lesson’, Nottingham Evening 
Post, 5 June 1940, p. 5; ‘Penalty for Spreading False Rumour’, The Citizen, 5 June 
1940, p. 5.  The case was also reported in the Yorkshire Evening Post, 5 June 1940, 
p. 7, The Derby Evening Telegraph, 5 June 1940, p. 1, and on the front page of the 
Daily Mirror, 5 June 1940; ‘First Chatterbug Squashed’, Daily Mirror, 6 June 1940, 
p. 7. 
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and the prospect of invasion, the British Government was concerned to eliminate 
any threat to public morale and invested considerable time and effort in collecting, 
analysing and tracing the source of rumours in public circulation, primarily 
through the establishment of an Anti-Lies Bureau within the MoI in 1940. The 
Bureau was established to track the influence of rumours, in particular those 
generated by the wartime propaganda broadcasts from Germany to Britain. It 
later played a central role in prosecuting individuals, including House, accused of 
spreading rumours under the 1939 Defence Act. This article examines the 
significance of the Bureau’s work and is based on a little used but extensive 
collection of letters sent by the public to the Bureau, held at the National Archives 
and the BBC Written Archives. The Bureau kept, logged and responded to the 
hundreds of letters it received reporting rumours, so preserving an otherwise 
ephemeral and oral historical source.3  
Some contemporaries and historians subsequently doubted the effect and 
importance of Haw-Haw’s broadcasts. Martin Doherty, reflecting the narrative of 
patriotic resilience and national impermeability, concludes that ‘all in all, the 
British were probably too stubborn, too phlegmatic, too pig–headed to be 
propagandised by Germans in wartime’; 4  Jean Seaton asserts that ‘on any 
empirical standards, he was 100% unsuccessful. He didn’t persuade anybody’;5  
Michael Balfour, who worked for the MoI during the war, characterised Haw-
Haw’s broadcasts as entirely ineffectual, cast into obscurity by a victorious BBC, 
with J.B. Priestley’s Postcripts leading the charge. 6   Placing emphasis on the 
success of Postscripts, Sian Nicholas characterises the appeal of Haw-Haw as little 
more than an ‘indictment of the quality of British broadcasting’ in 1940. But there 
is more to public reactions surrounding the German subversive broadcasts to 
Britain than their failure to produce a collapse in home front morale. While 
Nicholas claims that the MoI ‘entirely misjudged the nature of Joyce’s appeal’, she 
                                                        
3 It is not clear how many letters the Bureau received. The Bureau did not keep a 
numerical record, and those selecting documents for the National Archives 
would only have kept a representative sample of the letters received. 
4 M. A. Doherty, Nazi Wireless Propaganda. Lord Haw–Haw and British Public 
Opinion in the Second World War (Edinburgh, 2000), p. 191. 
5 Jean Seaton, interviewed for Every Case Tells a Story. Treason on Trial (BBC 
Radio 4, 15 January 2016).  
6 Michael Balfour, Propaganda in War, 1939-1945 (London, 1979), pp. 141-142.   
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also alludes to an equally critical factor in explaining public reactions to the 
German wartime propaganda broadcasts: that patriotic sentiment potentially 
prevented individuals from expressing their deeper concerns about Haw-Haw’s 
pronouncements and from revealing their emotional reactions to them.7   This 
problem is compounded by the fact that, as Mass–Observation’s Tom Harrisson 
recognised, the sources most frequently used by historians to reconstruct the 
national mood (such as Home Intelligence, Mass-Observation, Regional 
Information Officers’ (RIO) and BBC Listener Research Reports)  often reveal ‘only 
a part of private opinion and only that part which… dare show itself at any 
moment… [Individuals] will not necessarily voice publicly, as public opinion, 
certain parts of… private opinion, which is a complex of feelings, often conflicting’.8  
Such observations chime with recent histories of psychology that have 
drawn attention to the possibility that many emotional and psychological 
reactions to war were ‘unrecognised, unreported, or unaccepted’.9  While there is 
little evidence of widespread mental collapse, Mathew Thomson argues, ‘fear, 
bewilderment, and temporary breakdown, were nevertheless common features of 
the British home front’.10 Amy Bell’s study of fear in wartime London convincingly 
demonstrates Britons’ tendency to repress overt expressions of anxiety, deemed 
‘bad for morale and a social embarrassment’, 11  a claim supported by Ben 
Shepherd’s assessment that the wartime environment incited psychiatrists to 
support the notion that ‘Britain Can Take It’ and actively discouraged individuals 
to present with nervous symptoms. 12  Shepherd documents how, in order to 
circumvent the various barriers to expressing fear, individuals created and sought 
out activities that acted as safety valves, an explanation as to why underlying 
anxieties did not translate into widespread mental collapse.   
                                                        
7 Sian Nicholas, The Echo of War: Home Front Propaganda and the Wartime BBC, 
1939-45 (Manchester, 1996), p. 62.  
8 Tom Harrisson, ‘What is Public Opinion?’, Political Quarterly XI, 1–4 (1940), pp. 
369, 373.  
9 Mathew Thomson, Psychological Subjects. Identity, Culture and Health in 
Twentieth Century Britain (Oxford, 2006), p. 227.  
10 Ibid. 
11 Amy Bell, ‘Landscapes of Fear: Wartime London, 1939-45’, Journal of British 
Studies 48 (2009), p. 175. 
12 Ben Shepherd, A War of Nerves. Soldiers and Psychiatrists 1914-1994 (London, 
2002), p. 178. Shepherd, A War of Nerves, p. 178-9.  
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Social psychologists have long argued that rumour acts as such a safety 
valve at times of crisis, a means of expressing repressed emotions, fears and 
anxieties. That the study of rumour might provide an opportunity to examine 
those feelings was recognised during the war itself. The American psychologist 
Robert H. Knapp suggested in 1944 that a study of rumour allowed for a 
‘circumvent[ion of] the resistances and defences of the public’ in order to explain 
‘the deeper structure of public opinion’.13 Whereas explicit statements of opinion 
may replicate socially acceptable viewpoints, particularly at times of war, rumour 
is embedded in inherent social behaviours. Rumour is created, argued Knapp, ‘out 
of the impulse to interpret the world meaningfully and at the same time to gratify 
or give expression to human motives. Its function is both that of cognitive 
clarification and emotional expression’. Wartime rumours are, in short, imagined 
realities that capture individual understandings of conflict and responses to it. 14   
As such, the construction and transmission of rumours cannot be interpreted as a 
pathological condition, as is often the case.15  Rather, as the sociologist Tamotsu 
Shibutani argues, ‘rumour is part and parcel of the efforts of men to come to terms 
with the exigencies of life’, and so may be used as a means for understanding social 
structure and community interactions, and human behaviours, needs and 
emotions.16  
War provides fertile ground for an examination of the significance of 
rumour. Scholars of rumour from all disciplinary backgrounds agree that rumour 
thrives in critical or uncertain environments. Shibutani postulated that rumours 
assume particular importance when news becomes scarce or is considered 
unreliable, and at times of ‘sustained collective tension’, where rumour functions 
as a mechanism for reasserting some degree of control when individuals perceive 
themselves to be powerless.17  ‘Since men under sustained collective tension are 
already aroused’, he noted, ‘attention is easily focused upon any object that is 
                                                        
13 Robert H. Knapp, ‘A Psychology of Rumor’, Public Opinion Quarterly 8:1 
(Spring, 1944), p. 28.  
14 Ibid., p. 31.  
15 Cass Sunstein, On Rumours (London, 2009). My emphasis.  
16Shibutani, Improvised News, p. 62. 
17 Tamotsu Sibutani, Improvised News. A sociological study of rumor 
(Indianapolis, 1966), pp. 46-49. 
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likely to provide direction. A public has already started to form, and a rumour 
quickly sharpens its boundaries’. 18   Shibutani’s thesis proposed that rumour 
formation was subject to a complex dynamic.  It captures the notion that, at times, 
rumour sutures (sometimes unconnected) events together in an attempt at 
‘collective problem solving... [where individuals or groups] construe a meaningful 
interpretation... by pooling intellectual resources’; at other times, it fragments and 
challenges such conceptions, causing confusion and disorientation. Rumours sate 
the desire for information, becoming a platform for ‘improvised news’ where 
official confirmation does not or cannot exist. While not obviating a sense of 
foreboding, the practice of ‘improvising news’ provides a form of psychological 
stability in which events appear to be ‘foreseen’ or ‘predictable’.19  
Persistent rumour-mongering in wartime Britain was, in part, generated 
by popular suspicions that the authorities were withholding certain details about 
the course of the war. As a result, Britons turned to German broadcasts in the of 
winter 1939–40 through to late summer 1940, and again in the spring and 
summer of 1942, in order to glean the slightest piece of new information. The 
German broadcasts did indeed contain such titbits, but they were also infused with 
disinformation and propaganda, which in turn generated further speculations 
among British people. Moreover, passing on, elaborating and embroidering this 
information became a means of asserting control over an unpredictable situation.  
Reporting on the House case, the Yorkshire Post and Leeds Mercury accused the 
defendant of succumbing to ‘one of the commonest motives for rumour-
mongering in wartime. We all of us like feeling that we possess some exclusive 
piece of news which would create a sensation if revealed. It flatters our vanity and 
our sense of power’.20  This was the potential destructive force of German radio 
propaganda. Consequently, the Government recognised that it had both to 
confront Haw-Haw’s allegations and to close down the inventions and 
elaborations around them.  
Given the possibilities of studies of rumour to assist understanding of how 
individuals reacted to war and uncertain environments, rumour should not be 
                                                        
18 Ibid., p. 56.  
19 Ibid., passim. 
20 Yorkshire Post and Leeds Mercury, 7 June 1940, p. 4 
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dismissed as an assortment of fanciful and meaningless tales circulated by the 
‘unthinking masses’. Rather better means should be sought to understand what 
rumour represented, and its wider significance for complex historical events and 
processes. It is rumour’s ability not only to reflect deeper attitudes which are 
otherwise often obscured by the limited sources documenting public opinion, but 
also its ability to shape behaviours that affect the polity that lies at the heart of this 
article. Rumours operated as a site for negotiation between the individual and the 
state. In wartime Britain, rumour was transformed into a tool for positioning the 
individual beyond false dichotomies of conformity and resistance, allowing for a 
more sophisticated definition of state control and how contemporaries 
experienced it.  Government policy toward tracking rumour and the prosecution 
of rumour-mongers defined the limits of public acceptance of the principles 
underpinning the General Regulations of the 1939 Defence Act.   Rumour was as 
much about dissent from as accommodation of government security policy, and 
popular reaction to this policy reveals much about individual and collective 
agency. As such, a study of the rumours surrounding the broadcasts of Lord Haw-
Haw permits insight into the dynamics of power and how it is negotiated.  
 
Confronting ‘the Voice’: Early Press Reaction to Haw-Haw and the 
Establishment of the Anti-Lies Bureau 
 
William Joyce first broadcast on the German home service radio on 6 
September 1939 and, according to MI5, to Britain from 18 September.21  Known 
initially only as ‘the Voice’, he was employed as scriptwriter for and contributor 
to the Concordia stations (or the geheime Sonderdienststelle), established in 
October 1939. There were six regular or semi-regular stations broadcasting in 
English from Germany to the UK22 and several temporary stations, with up to nine 
                                                        
21 E. Shelmerdine to Mr Wakefield on Joyce’s early broadcasts, 8 September 
1945, TNA KV2/247. Transcripts of the BBC Monitoring Service, E189–214, 
Imperial War Museum, Duxford. These records have since been transferred to 
the BBC. 
22 These were New British Broadcasting Station (February 1940- April 1945), 
Worker’s Challenge (July 1940–late 1944), the Christian Peace Movement (later 
renamed the Christian Peace Pledge, July 1940–February 1942), Radio National 
(July 1943–April 1945), and Radio Caledonia for Scottish audiences (July 1940–
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transmissions daily of around 15 minutes.23 In March 1940, the BBC estimated 
that the subversive stations attracted 6 million regular listeners and 18 million 
occasional listeners. 24  Joyce’s broadcasts dwelt on sensitive subjects, such as 
Britain’s plutocratic caste, slum housing, unemployment, class disparities, the 
excesses of Empire, and anti-Semitism. They extracted stories from the British 
Press for comment, released what they claimed to be ‘censored news’, and 
encouraged Britons to take matters into their own hands by forming local fifth-
column units designed to topple the Government. The segment of the New British 
Broadcasting Station’s programme entitled ‘Between Ourselves’ offered detailed 
instructions to potential fifth-columnists and agents provocateurs, including 
propaganda strategies and how to commit acts of sabotage. Given the potential for 
Joyce’s words to incite subversive action and thought, the broadcasts were 
transcribed word-for-word at the BBC Monitoring Service; the Department for 
Publicity in Enemy Countries used the transcripts to prepare briefings for the War 
Cabinet, including analyses of themes, propagandistic pressure points, and 
potential strategies for countering enemy claims.25 
During the early stages of the war, much work on the subversive stations 
took place behind closed doors. This led the Press to conclude that the 
Government, and specifically the MoI, had underestimated the threat to public 
morale posed by the German propaganda broadcasts.  The Daily Mirror, already 
considered a radical influence by the Government, launched the most vociferous 
                                                        
July 1942): Horst J.P. Bergmeier and Rainer E. Lotz, Hitler’s Airwaves. The Inside 
Story of Nazi Radio Broadcasting and Propaganda Swing (New Haven, 1997), pp. 
197–99, and Doherty, Nazi Wireless Propaganda, pp. 1–34.  
23 For example, the dedicated female station, Polly on the Wire (October 1940), 
Welsh National Radio (July and August 1940), Free India Radio (from February 
1941), and Station Debunk to the United States (March 1942-1943), BBC 
Monitoring Service records, E189–214. Ogilvie to Stuart, 26 December 1939, HO 
186/313.   There is some suggestion that Joyce had been identified, however. 
See, for example, WAC R34/639/1. See also, ‘Studies in British Propaganda: The 
Voice of Hamburg’ BBC, 14 February 1940, TNA FO 371/24393.  
24 ‘Hamburg Broadcasting Propaganda. Summary of the results of an enquiry into 
the extent and effect of its impact on the British Public during mid-Winter 
1939/40’, Listener Research Section, BBC, 8 March 1940, LR/98, HO 186/313.  
25 See, for example, ‘Analysis of German Propaganda’, January 1–15 1940, 
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for the war Cabinet, 
January 1940, FO 371/24393.  
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attack on the assumed official response to the subversive stations in June 1940, 
with the creation of its Anti-Haw-Haw League. The columnist Bill Greig accused 
the MoI of failing to ‘[raise] a hand… against’ Haw-Haw, asking his readers to make 
a pledge: ‘put your hand on that heart of yours and promise that: you will never 
again listen to Haw-Haw or to one of his drivelling clan. You will refuse to 
hear any mention of his name. You will do all in your power, by derision and 
use of facts, to stop the spread of any harmful rumour, whether from Haw-
Haw or not’.26 The newspaper issued flyers and stickers for readers’ wireless sets 
(Figure 2). By 10 June, Greig claimed to have inspired an anti-Haw-Haw street 
(Leahurst Road, Lewisham), followed five days later by the proclamation of the 
first anti-Haw-Haw town, Woolwich, appropriately the home of the famous 
arsenal.27 By 19 June, the League boasted 50,000 pledges. 28  
 
                                                        
26 Bill Greig, ‘Join League to kill voice of Haw Haw’, Daily Mirror, 6 June 1940, p. 3. 
Bold in original.   
27 Daily Mirror, 10 June 1940, p. 3; Daily Mirror, 15 June 1940, p. 2.  
28 Daily Mirror, 19 June 1940, p. 2.  
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Figure 2: Anti-Haw-Haw League Radio Sticker, Daily Mirror, 6 June 1940. 
 
However, the Daily Mirror campaign provided further publicity for the 
German subversive broadcasts, trading on Haw-Haw’s notoriety and on public 
fascination with the nation’s new anti-hero.  Even before the advent of the League, 
Lord Haw-Haw had entered the British popular consciousness through both 
mainstream and more outlandish media. He was the subject of regular feature 
articles in newspapers and magazines, popular songs by the comedic duo the 
Western Brothers, pantomime jokes, and a highly-successful West-End show at 
the Holborn Empire starring Max Miller.29 He featured in adverts to sell woollen 
vests and margarine (Figure 3),30 as the focus of wall chalkings in Fulham,31 and 
                                                        
29 Advertisement for ‘Haw–Haw!’, Daily Mail, 14 February 1940, p. 8; ‘Pantomime 
Report’, Mass-Observation Archive (M-O A) File Report (FR) 45 (L.E.), March 
1940. 
30 Advertisement for Wolsey, Picture Post, 11 September 1943, p. 2. 
31 ‘Wall Chalkings, Fulham’ (H.P.), 5 October 1940, M-O A Topic Collection (TC) 
87/43.  
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as the namesake of an Indian Mynah bird who ‘imitates the nasal tone of that 
humourist as he says “This is Germany calling. This is Germany calling”’, the star 
of the caged bird exhibition at the Royal Horticultural Hall in February 1940.32 
Jonah Barrington of the Daily Express, who coined the pseudonym ‘Lord Haw–
Haw’, claimed that within weeks of the ‘Christening’, Haw–Haw ‘had become an 
international character’. Despite describing Haw–Haw’s transmissions as ‘pure 
poison’, Barrington asserted that ‘through the columns of the Daily Express, he has 
been transformed into a harmless (and widely popular) comedian’.33  Barrington 
undoubtedly profited from association with Haw–Haw’s infamy, and the Daily 
Express, having seemingly neutralised Joyce’s propagandistic bite by mockery, 
could assert patriotic advantage over its Press rivals. For the Daily Express, 
capitalising on Haw–Haw was as much about commerce as counter–propaganda.  
A letter from J.L. Garbutt, the editor of the Express, to Frederick Ogilvie, Director 
General of the BBC, in December 1939 exposed the newspaper’s intention to seek 
the ‘scoop’: suggesting that the BBC rebut Haw-Haw’s claims through special 
broadcasts, Garbutt asked, ‘Should this idea find favour, and eventually be 
adopted, may I say that my only request is that I be given first intimation of it, and 
allowed to publish the story exclusively’.34 Journalists and advertisers were not 
immune to exploiting propaganda for profit; indeed, as Jay Winter noted of the 
First World War, the two were not mutually exclusive.35 If, as Mass–Observation 
commented, Haw–Haw was ‘the joint production of the German propaganda 
ministry and our own popular imagination’, then the Press was complicit in its 
manufacture.36  
  
 
                                                        
32 ‘Birds on the Air’, Daily Telegraph, 8 February 1940, p. 6.  
33 Jonah Barrington, Lord Haw–Haw of Zeesen (Tiptree, 1939), p. 9.  
34 J.L Garbutt to Ogilvie, 27 December 1939, WAC R34/639/1.  
35 Jay Winter cited in James Aulich and John Hewitt, Seduction or Instruction? 
First World War Posters in Britain and Europe (Manchester, 2007), p. 115. 
36 ‘Public and Private Opinion of Haw–Haw’, M-O A FR 65, 29 March 1940. See 
also a Home Intelligence report which blamed the Daily Mirror’s ‘Anti– Haw–Haw 
League’ campaign for an increase in listenership, ‘Points from Regions (Bristol)’, 
12 June 1940, in Paul Addison and Jeremy A. Crang (eds), Listening to Britain. 
Home Intelligence Reports on Britain’s Finest Hour. May to September 1940 
(London, 2010), p. 106.    
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Figure 3: Advert for Meadow Dairy Margarine, Picture Post, 11 September 1943,   
 
Such publicity served to exaggerate the initial threat posed by the 
subversive broadcasts, generated further public speculation about the veracity of 
Haw-Haw’s claims, and unwittingly made it difficult to measure their effect on 
morale, ultimately misleading officials attempting to develop counter-propaganda 
strategies.  Press coverage operated at the extremes. Campaigns, such as that 
orchestrated by Greig, denounced all rumour-mongers as fifth-columnists and 
 13 
traitors, while Barrington sought to portray Haw-Haw as a subject for popular 
ridicule and light entertainment. Humour was frequently mobilised by individuals 
to mask deeper feelings of insecurity induced by Nazi broadcasts. Mass–
Observation, the anthropological movement established in 1937 to record a 
‘science of ourselves’, remarked upon the public’s ability to mimic the light–
hearted approach adopted by certain journalists. Mass–Observation noted the 
‘striking… difference between their own [the public’s] private view and what they 
think the public thinks… To say that Haw–Haw is worth listening to because he’s 
so funny is the stock response, the social sterio [sic], neutralising or at any rate 
masking a private tendency to feel uneasy or depressed’. Mass-Observers 
concluded that it was ‘unwise to underestimate Haw–Haw’s final effect because it 
is the done thing to call him funny’. 37 Raymond Burns, writing in The Evening 
News and Southern Mail in January 1940, warned that ‘as the emotional strain of 
this war increases, we may pay rather a price in nerves among some listeners for 
the mistake we made in hailing the broadcasts with glee’, not least since the 
tendency to listen in to the Hamburg station revealed a mistrust of official news 
and the suspicion that important information was being censored.38   
While the BBC pointed to the draw of the ‘exotic’, with the public seemingly 
unable to deny themselves the ‘“thrill” of hearing, from the comfortable security 
of one’s fireside, the voice of one’s would–be destroyer’, its report into the 
Hamburg broadcasts accused listeners of ‘ransacking the wavebands’ in a 
misplaced ‘desire to “hear both sides”’ by ‘a people that prides itself on its fair-
mindedness’.39 Setting aside the patriotic sentiment inherent in this statement, 
the BBC identified a link between the subversive broadcasts and wider public 
concern over the extent of censorship. A Regional Information Officer’s report 
from Belfast on 29 June 1940 indicated that ‘Many people are reported to think 
that there is some ground for Haw–Haw’s attack on the BBC and British 
                                                        
37 ‘Public and Private Opinion of Haw–Haw’, M-O A FR 65, 29 March 1940. ‘Sterio’ 
is reproduced in the original.     
38 ‘Propaganda by the Fireside’, Evening News and Southern Daily Mail, 27 
January 1940, p. 4.  
39 ‘Hamburg Broadcasting Propaganda. Summary of the results of an enquiry into 
the extent and effect of its impact on the British Public during mid-Winter 
1939/40’, Listener Research Section, BBC, 8 March 1940, LR/98, HO 186/313.                                                                                                                                                                   
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newspaper editorials for glossing over unpleasant facts’. 40  Fears over censorship 
were particularly acute with the revelation that in July 1940 the Government had 
withheld news of the sinking of the SS Lancastria, with numbers of those listening 
to the Hamburg station increasing in order ‘to obtain a more correct version’.41  
Haw–Haw was not to be dismissed as an enemy propagandist peddling lies: rather 
he was regarded by the authorities as ‘a well–informed syndicate’, using 
‘material… taken directly and quite fairly accurately from British sources’. 42 
Moreover, Mass–Observation overheard conversations that credited the 
broadcasts with offering ‘tit-bits of truth’ which were later confirmed by officials, 
adding to Haw-Haw’s legitimacy as a news source.43  
The perceived paucity of news on the progress of the war combined with 
popular mistrust of government reports and the suggestion that Nazi propaganda 
broadcasts were supplying withheld information created a fertile environment for 
the spread of rumour. As Shibutani argues, ‘if the demand for news in a public 
exceeds the supply made available through institutional channels, rumour 
construction is likely to occur’.44  The Press made every effort, on rare occasions 
as a result of encouragement from the MoI, to neutralise the importance and 
character of the Haw–Haw rumours.  Reports either reduced the rumours to petty 
concerns, one example being John Walter’s cartoon for Punch (figure 4), or 
provided counter-evidence, such as the Daily Mail article that sought to disprove 
Haw–Haw’s claim that evacuees were undernourished by reporting on children’s 
increased body weight since the start of the war.45 While the content of Haw-
Haw’s broadcasts could be rebutted, speculations, abstractions, 
misunderstandings and rumour were far more difficult to control and quickly 
                                                        
40 Home Intelligence Report, ‘Points from the regions (Belfast)’, 29 June 1940, in 
Addison and Crang, Listening to Britain, p. 167. See also, ‘Reaction to Enemy 
Broadcasts, RIO Scotland to Home Division and HI, 22 May 1940, TNA  INF 
1/265/6.  
41 Home Intelligence Report, ‘Points from the regions (London)’, 31 July 1940, 
Addison and Crang, Listening to Britain, p. 288.  
42 Ogilvie to Stuart, 26 December 1939, HO 186/313. 
43 ‘Radio Survey. Liverpool Street–Romford’, 5 May 1940, M–O A TC 74/59–77.  
44 Shibutani, Improvised News, p. 57.  
45 ‘Roast Lamb Lunch for Ten in Mrs Woods’ Home’, Daily Mail, 15 January 1940, 
p. 7; Andrew Stewart (Broadcasting Division) to Kenneth Clark, Mr Macadam, HI, 
and Miss Neville-Rolfe, n.d., INF 1/265.   
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became the authorities’ primary concern. However, the officials of the MoI, Home 
Intelligence and the BBC soon realised that they were dealing with a curious and 
serious phenomenon:  it was not that the public were simply repeating rumours 
broadcast by Haw-Haw – rather they were falsely attributing all manner of 
rumours to Joyce in order to lend credibility and authority to speculation, just as 
Sidney House had done before his prosecution in June 1940. In this context, the 
rumours were more likely to be believed and relayed, with potentially subversive 
implications.  
 
 
Figure 4. Punch, 10 July 1940.  
 
 
A Home Intelligence report of 30 May 1940 warned that, ‘Haw–Haw 
continues to be regarded as the fountain–head of rumours…. Such is his influence 
that it appears that rumours attributed to him are far more readily believed than 
those which are said to have other sources’. 46  Britons credited the Haw–Haw 
broadcasts with providing specific information, information that the BBC 
                                                        
46 Home Intelligence Report, ‘Today’s Rumours’, 30 May 1940, Addison and 
Crang, Listening to Britain, p. 58.  
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Monitoring Service confirmed was not present in its transcripts.47 Why did so 
many rumours in the period from January to September 1940 carry Haw–Haw’s 
‘imprimatur’?48 The Haw–Haw rumours were of a special character: since Haw–
Haw attracted newspaper and government attention and was en vogue, the public 
projected wider concerns and anxieties on to the rumours attributed to Haw–Haw.  
This might explain why those who admitted to never having listened to Haw–Haw, 
such as House, continued to construct or repeat rumours which they ascribed to 
his broadcasts. Haw–Haw rumours became vessels holding a wide variety of 
public concerns. It was this process, rather than the public opinion of Haw–Haw 
per se, that formed the basis of the Anti-Lies Bureau’s work.  
 Although the Daily Mirror claimed a pivotal role in goading the MoI into 
responding to Haw-Haw in its publicity campaign to encourage Britons to ‘join the 
Silent Column’,49 the work of the Anti-Lies Bureau had been quietly under way for 
some time. The Bureau had been formed in early 1940 as part of the Foreign 
Division of the MoI in order to ‘to counter German lies’ by releasing ‘certain 
material through the B.B.C and/or the Press’. From the outset the Bureau took the 
firm line that the materials passed to the media were not ‘direct denials of idiotic 
statements’; rather ‘information obtained is woven into general matter which may 
be disseminated abroad by various agencies’.  Its publication, Talking Points, was 
the key mechanism for overseas counter-propaganda initiatives sent to ‘chosen 
people abroad who are depended upon to give currency to the information 
contained in it’.50 As a sub-division of the MoI, the Bureau became the victim of 
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inter-agency disputes and competition, failing to win the co-operation of other 
government departments and frequently subjected to take-over attempts by 
ambitious Departments seeking to expand their sphere of influence. 51  In 
monitoring and countering German radio propaganda activity in the UK, the 
Bureau became increasingly involved in tracking and tracing rumour. Indeed, this 
became the main aspect of its work, such was the volume of correspondence from 
the public it received. Rumours were logged and a response provided to the 
informer, as a personalised letter scotching the rumour and providing alternative 
information, although this was later abandoned due to the number of letters 
received.52 The Bureau’s logbooks permitted the Ministry to collate information 
about rumours, pinpoint their geography, trace their lifespan and transformation, 
and record any official action taken. Information was shared with key government 
agencies and fed into the discussions of the War Cabinet. The Bureau coordinated 
its activity with the Ministry’s network of RIOs to combat rumour at a local level. 
53 Following specific appeals in the Press and through the RIOs, the Bureau and 
the BBC Monitoring Service received hundreds of reports of Haw-Haw rumours in 
circulation in all parts of the country. Why did the public respond to such appeals 
on such a scale, and why were Haw-Haw rumours seemingly so prevalent? 
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Writing to the Bureau: Emotions, Identities and Agency 
 
From the outset, the public were enlisted as participants in the Bureau’s 
work. The Bureau and associated agencies (such as the Home Office and Home 
Intelligence Division) understood that the process of tracing rumour was labour 
intensive, and that the extent of rumour–mongering could only be captured 
through information supplied by the public.54  The task facing the Bureau was 
complicated by three interrelated factors:  responding to Haw-Haw’s false claims 
was problematic; there was no pattern to the rumours; and the rumours circulated 
appeared to be unconnected to the actual broadcasts as transcribed by the BBC 
Monitoring Service.  
Ministry officials were reluctant to refute Haw-Haw’s claims: it was 
undesirable to convey the impression that ‘the Germans are getting under our 
skin’ by providing additional coverage on the BBC, and yet the Ministry had a 
responsibility to make the public ‘fully aware that this is nothing but extremely 
active Fifth Column stuff’. 55 Letters to the Bureau frequently demanded official 
interventions, including calls for systematic jamming and for programmes taking 
apart Haw-Haw’s arguments.56 However, jamming simply fed popular suspicions 
over draconian censorship, and BBC involvement was awkward, not least since 
some members of the public and indeed official bodies blamed failings in BBC 
output for Haw–Haw’s popularity. 57  Mary Adams, the Director of Home 
Intelligence, advised the Bureau that Haw–Haw was best combated through 
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‘[improved] reception of BBC programmes… and official news bulletins’. 58 The 
BBC’s attempt to discredit the broadcasts in a February 1940 radio documentary, 
The Ear of Britain, was met with a mixed response. It also alerted the public to the 
fact that the BBC Monitoring Service transcribed Nazi propagandists’ every word, 
resulting in an increased demand for copies of the transcripts from members of 
the public wishing to check the official account of the subversive stations’ 
content.59  
Unsurprisingly, letters to the Bureau peaked at times of uncertainty 
(during the phoney war, for example) or crisis (May–September 1940 and with 
the renewed raids of spring 1942, the so-called Baedeker Raids, and several 
significant military set-backs, such as the loss of Singapore in February 1942 and 
Tobruk in June 1942, the difficulties in the Burma campaign in the same year, and 
the paucity of news from the Eastern Front).60 These periods were also the most 
intense for the spread of Haw–Haw rumours.  While the tone and content of 
rumours remained relatively consistent across peak periods, the Bureau noted 
that there was no distinct pattern in the location of such rumours – they circulated 
in all parts of the UK, in rural and urban communities – nor in their trajectory, 
reflecting the cumulative and non-linear properties of rumours. In such 
circumstances, the Bureau struggled to trace the source of particular rumours and 
to explain their extent in terms of location and frequency.  
The most persistent and widespread rumour related to claims that Haw-
Haw mentioned that town hall clocks were running late or displayed an inaccurate 
time, suggesting the presence of local fifth-columnists or infiltration of German 
spies. This rumour resurfaced in different locations and at various points in 1940 
and 1942. In June 1940, Home Intelligence reported fears that ‘Lord Haw-Haw is 
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alleged to have stated that the Darlington Town hall clock is two minutes slow, 
which in fact it is’.61 Greig’s Anti-Haw-Haw League column further perpetuated 
this rumour by suggesting that similar utterances had been heard as part of the 
‘three clocks yarn in Silvertown, Cambridge and Wolverhampton’. 62  It was 
replicated in relation to the Grand Stand at Ascot in March 194163 and Harrogate 
Town Hall in May 1942.64  While these rumours persisted throughout the war, 
they were considered ‘trivial’ compared to the development of a new genre of 
rumour that ‘deal entirely with threats to particular districts… the Anti-Lies 
Bureau has heard that alleged threats to bomb particular factories or areas are 
having a very wide and disturbing effect’.65 Through careful comparison between 
the rumours and the transcripts of the broadcasts, it became clear that Haw-Haw 
was not in fact making threats to specific districts; 66  rather he made general 
inferences (for example, ‘it is merely necessary to drop a few powerful bombs on 
Crewe, Rugby, Leicester, Birmingham and Doncaster to render rail transport 
completely useless’).67  
Why did so many Britons falsely attribute rumours to the subversive 
broadcasts? The answer may lie in reading the letters to the Bureau through a 
sociological and psychological lens. The  sociologist Tamotsu Shibutani regarded 
rumour as an act of ‘collective problem solving’ and a means of coping with 
ambiguous or uncertain situations, where appropriate actions remain ill–defined 
but individuals feel compelled to act.68 Rather than a passive anxiety response, 
rumour construction and transmission became a ‘collective transaction, involving 
a division of labor among participants, each of whom makes a different 
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contribution, acting as, for example, evaluator, speculator, ‘messenger…, 
interpreter, … sceptic,… protagonist,… agitator… [and] decision–maker’:69 such 
roles were to be found in the letters to the Bureau. Moreover, since rumour is 
frequently constructed outside an ‘institutional framework’, he argued, ‘there are 
opportunities for spontaneity, expediency, and improvisation’. 70   Such 
improvisation included the tendency of individuals to shape and tailor rumour to 
particular needs or anxieties, including false attribution to gain greater attention 
from the authorities by those in a powerless and unstable situation.  At times, 
emotional and psychological need drove the decision to write to the Ministry; at 
others, the practice was far more instrumental.  
Instrumental practice, whereby those who reported rumour used 
institutional mechanisms for their own benefit, is prevalent in letters to the 
authorities. This practice features heavily in Jean Noel Kapferer’s explanation of 
rumour as a form of currency with a distinct ‘commodity value’, contending that 
‘the immediate re–diffusion of a rumour… can be compared to consumer 
behaviour in countries where the local currency depreciates rapidly: people spend 
their money as soon as they receive it in order to capitalise on its monetary 
value’. 71  Information possesses a specific value at a given time, and rumour 
transmission results in rewards and gratification, characterised frequently by the 
lessening of ‘cognitive dissonance’ through the reduction of anxiety or as a form 
of catharsis. Kapferer’s thesis might explain the speed and scope of rumour 
transmission in wartime Britain. The value and currency of information regarding 
potential air–raids in the summer of 1940 and again during renewed raids in 1942 
was particularly high, especially where there was a ‘paucity of official news’.72  The 
Bureau was so inundated with letters during the ‘Baedeker Raids’ that it appealed 
to other departments for assistance, warning that they were not dealing with ‘one 
or two individuals claiming to have heard the threats, but widespread rumours’.73 
                                                        
69 Shibutani, Improvised News, pp. 13–15.  
70 Ibid., p. 23.  
71 Jean-Noel Kapferer, Rumors. Uses, Interpretations, and Images (New 
Brunswick, 1991), pp. 51–52. See also Knapp on rumour and gratification, 
Knapp, ‘A Psychology of Rumor’, p. 23. 
72 Adams to Stewart, 28 November 1940, INF 1/265. 
73 Jellicoe to Parker, 13 May 1942, INF 1/266.  
 22 
The nature of the letters to the authorities suggest that individuals were seeking 
to exchange information on the Haw–Haw rumours for official knowledge of 
potential raids, correlating with Kapferer’s suggestion that ‘rumours [may] not 
take off from the truth but [they certainly] seek out the truth’, or rather what is 
perceived to be the truth.74 In short, creating or repeating a rumour is a ‘purposive 
behaviour’.75 
That the public thought the Government knew of future raids and was 
deliberately withholding details from the population further emphasised the 
popular mistrust of the authorities and news reports. The majority of letters were 
individually tailored requests for details of government information about local 
raids – in particular individual requests for information about the letter-writers’ 
own streets or towns, or about buildings or local businesses they frequented. In 
many cases, individuals wanted to protect themselves from the effects of raids but 
also from the deleterious effects of the rumours themselves. One letter, from 
McSymonds’ Stores, a steamship furnishers based in Liverpool, lamented the loss 
of business due to the rumour that the store had been razed to the ground – they 
sustained damage in a raid but continued to trade. Postal censors prevented the 
store from contacting clients to scotch these rumours, which intensified the 
speculation, not only in Britain but in ports around the world, demonstrating the 
ability of rumour to travel. McSymonds subsequently lost significant amounts of 
income.76 Rumours were not confined to the threat of bombing, however; they 
extended to unemployment, financial collapse, fear that employees would not be 
paid, Hitler’s ‘plans’ to intensify sleep deprivation workers, and war profiteering, 
all of which led the Ministry to fear widespread defeatism among war workers. 
Holmes Brothers, specialising in precision woodwork, was concerned that its 
trading name had been brought into disrepute following a rumour accusing the 
firm of ‘profiteering at the expense of the workers’.77 Oldham, Holland and Co., 
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chartered accountants, contacted the Bureau to verify workers’ claims that they 
had overheard Lord Haw-Haw announce that last Friday’s payroll would be the 
last for employees at a factory in Morden and threatening increased sleep 
deprivation in coming months due to aerial bombardment. This, the company’s 
chairman claimed, could affect the 150 workers who were ‘engaged on the war 
effort’.78  For businesses, the financial and reputational consequences could be 
significant. 
Businesses were often quite open about their financial and operational 
motives for contacting the Bureau. Numerous businesses reported that staff 
declined to turn up for work, following suggestions of a potential raid on a factory 
or workplace, with a negative effect on profits. Company directors were keen to 
rebut any specious claims that enemy broadcasts had identified specific factories 
as a target, requesting copies of newspaper reports, details of successful 
prosecutions for careless talk, and BBC Monitoring Service transcripts for 
distribution among the workforce.79 On occasion, the transcripts were to be used 
as the basis for disciplinary investigations, as managers ‘armed with [the 
Ministry’s] assurance’ attempted to ‘nail down… unfortunate rumour-monger[s] 
in the factory’.80 The concern over the effect of Haw–Haw rumours on wartime 
productivity led the Ministry to consider despatching its staff to factories to  ‘very 
tactfully to interrogate witnesses of this kind’.81 Fears over being singled out by 
Haw-Haw threats, and the potential financial consequences of the resultant 
rumours, led to some firms wishing to be publicly disassociated with 
government.82  Just as businesses feared that they would be targeted as a result of 
involvement in government affairs, local communities distanced themselves from 
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official initiatives.  In Dorking, following a petition from townspeople, a proposal 
to exhibit a Messerschmidt to raise money for the local spitfire fund had to be 
postponed ‘on the grounds that Lord Haw-Haw had said that every town in which 
a German ‘plane was shown would be bombed’.83  
Individual members of the public wrote in to allay fears, share anxieties, 
and, like businesses, elicit specific information as to whether they were to be in 
the line of fire.  Here, the language of citizenship was frequently put to work to 
emphasise the patriotic intentions of the author: most letter-writers were keen to 
state that they did not engage in rumour-mongering and that they refrained from 
listening to enemy broadcasts. 84  If Amy Bell is correct in her conclusion that 
Britons sought to repress overt expressions of fear, deemed ‘bad for morale and a 
social embarrassment’, 85 then the letters reporting rumour – at a remove, with 
unpatriotic panic attributed to others – became a socially acceptable means of 
communicating anxieties. While there was a reported case of a 53 year–old 
woman who gassed herself after listening to Lord Haw–Haw,86 for the majority, 
fear existed below the surface and, from time to time, needed to be expressed and 
released. The Ministry’s solicitation of reports on rumours led some to write in 
seeking reassurance and asking the state to intervene in order to strengthen 
personal resolve. A Miss Verney reported her isolation from her fellow factory 
workers due to her reluctance to engage in rumour-mongering: ‘they call me 
alsorts [sic] of fools for believing in you, and I find that nine out of every ten of 
them listen to Lord Haw-Haw, saying that they can get more truth from him, and 
they want me to do the same’. Verney concluded that she was buckling under the 
social pressure, pleading with the Bureau’s staff to offer information to prove that 
the rumours were false.87  
Others seemingly sought to assert their – perhaps superficial – resilience 
in the face of enemy propaganda provocations, a resilience generated in part by 
the false sense of security engendered by attempts to predict the future. Following 
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intense aerial bombardment in September 1940, Home Intelligence reported a 
significant increase in listening to Haw–Haw by those intent on ‘[picking] up hints 
about coming events’.88 A letter in December 1940 reported ‘harmful rumours’ 
around Winchester suggesting that Haw-Haw was ‘threatening […] you 
Winchester people […with] destruction in the near future’. The author requested 
specific details on the threats or an official refutation: ‘should I be wrong in my 
conviction’, she wrote, ‘I should be glad to know the truth whatever it is. I can “take 
it”, and am not likely to repeat it’.89   
As these examples suggest, letters used linguistic devices associated with a 
certain level of intimacy with the recipient, with underlying suggestions of faith 
and trust.  But the meaning of this language is ambiguous: on the one hand, such 
gestures could be a performance, replicating the language of the state’s appeals in 
order to extract information or for personal reassurance; alternatively, they could 
speak to a deep commitment to the protection of the national community at a time 
of crisis.  Most letters underscore the role of rumour as a ‘safety valve’ for 
repressed emotions, particularly episodes of anxiety.90 Ben Shepherd’s analysis of 
psychiatrists at war has pointed to the contemporary neglect of repressed 
emotions at times of crisis, suggesting that some psychiatrists had succumbed to 
the “Britain Can Take it” mood of 1940–1. The renowned psychoanalyst Edward 
Glover went so far as to suggest that ‘the pre-war neurosis myth was replaced by 
“the opposite myth that no neurotic reactions are produced by air-raids which is 
equally fallacious”’.91 Yet some wartime psychologists wrote extensively on public 
emotional reactions and in particular on the distinction between fear and anxiety. 
The latter was associated, according to F. Bennett Julian, author of a manual for 
post-raid psychological ‘first–aid’, with  
insecurity. It is directed more towards what may happen than towards 
what has happened or is happening. It is directed towards a potential 
rather than an actual danger. Anxiety requires thought and reflection – at 
least in their primitive form. The stimulus comes, not from perception of 
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an object which threatens, but almost entirely from fantasy or imagination. 
The physiological pattern of anxiety is therefore not innate but acquired. 92  
 
Haw–Haw, and the publicity surrounding his broadcasts, undoubtedly fuelled the 
popular imagination, explaining in part why rumours may have been falsely 
attributed to him, and creating a state of constant suspense during periods of 
intense aerial bombardment. 93  John Langdon Davies, former journalist turned 
military instructor for the Home Guard, concluded that it was in the aftermath of 
raids that individuals were more likely to return to primitive, subconscious 
behaviours. ‘The air raid stuns the man’s power of conscious thought’, he asserted, 
‘but not his body’s power of action, nor his unconscious needs tying him to his 
fellows’.94 The psychological disruption following intense raids, not necessarily by 
those experiencing them, but more frequently by those who had not, and the 
attempt to forge communal bonds may explain the extent and nature of the Haw–
Haw rumours. Individuals’ emotional needs, which could not necessarily be met 
by sharing anxieties given the constraints of the need to share patriotic 
sentiments, were performed through rumour, which functioned as a means of 
expression at one remove. Kampferer identified rumour transmission and 
confirmation as a ‘first step to blowing off steam’ in order to ‘reduce anxiety’ by 
inviting 
 
interlocutors… to prove… that the rumours are groundless or 
meaningless…. And as hearsay has a guilt-diffusing function – always 
supposed, as it is, to come from someone else – it allows for the freest 
expression of repressed and unavowable drives. One thus understands 
why they arise in situations and environments with a high degree of moral 
censorship: rumours are anonymous letters that anyone can write with 
total impunity.95  
 
The letter writers perceived the Ministry and BBC as primary interlocutors whose 
function was to defuse rumours, uphold morale, and reassure the public, a 
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function that stood in tension with popular mistrust of the authorities and fears of 
the extension of wartime executive powers.  Moreover, rumour allowed 
individuals to reduce personal cognitive dissonance by sharing concerns within a 
‘safe’ environment, where reports had been actively solicited and sanctioned as a 
patriotic gesture, freeing individuals to release deeper anxieties at a remove and 
in the service of others. This benefited both the individual and the State. For the 
authorities, reporting overheard rumour channelled such anxieties into safe 
bounds, while the individual could attribute (unpatriotic) fear to others, some 
authors suggesting that they were writing to the authorities in order to assist 
‘nervous people’.96  
Given that much psychological work before the war concentrated on the 
effects of aerial bombardment,97 the authorities were pre-conditioned to expect 
fear and anxiety to be the normal public response. It is unsurprising that these 
negative emotions feature so heavily in the Bureau and Ministry records. But it is 
equally important not to minimise more positive or neutral motivations for 
sharing rumours. Anti-aircraft command headquarters reported to Lieutenant 
General Sir Robert Gordon-Finlayson, adjutant to the Forces at War Office that 
rumours that followed the subversive broadcasts could alleviate the endless wait 
for military instruction, even though the consequences were uncertain.98 More 
powerful still were the rumours generated by hope.  From December 1940 to May 
1942, the Bureau and the BBC received requests from families who had heard a 
rumour that details of POWs were being broadcast on enemy stations.99 Families 
desperate for news of loved ones requested to see BBC Monitoring Service 
transcripts after rumours circulated in local communities that sons, fathers, 
brothers and husbands had been mentioned by name.   Local police reports 
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confirmed a marked increase of interest in broadcasts when ‘names of survivors 
from the British submarines which were sunk recently, were reported to have 
been broadcast’,100 and that ‘revived’ interest in the subversive stations could be 
‘attributed to the increased desire for information about British prisoners’.101    
Equally, involvement in scotching rumour afforded local communities a 
prominent place in the unfolding national story. Local initiatives to combat 
rumour, such as the suggestion in May 1942 that RIOs ‘send out a loud-speaker 
van’, 102  offered the local authorities a greater sense of status, authority and 
position.103  Birmingham’s Evening Despatch celebrated its RIOs as ‘seven people 
with a big task but – they know the answers to Lord Haw-Haw’,104 such attention 
sharpening the levelling effect of national publicity campaigns. Empowered by the 
rhetoric of the ‘People’s War’, individuals too attempted to carve out a role in the 
wartime drama and invested themselves with especial historical importance, 
while capitalising on the social advantage of ‘being in the know’ and in possession 
of secret and privileged information. This information could be deployed for the 
national good and in service of the war effort or to derive a sense of self-
importance.  In this respect, there was paradoxically little distinction between the 
act of reporting a rumour and the temporary prestige derived from spreading the 
rumour to others. The Falkirk Herald of 29 May 1940 identified that ‘some of these 
people invent and spread rumours because they feel that it gives them a sense of 
power, the power which comes from secret knowledge. It is a method of attracting 
attention, and it is a marvellously potent way of gaining a momentary importance 
for some one who would not otherwise be noticed’.105  
This was not simply narcissistic behaviour, however. Individuals may well 
have used rumour-mongering to psychologically contain and respond to events 
seemingly beyond their control, events that provoked deep emotional reactions 
intensified by a sense of personal impotence.  In a report sent to Mary Adams in 
February 1941, Tom Harrisson observed that ‘ordinary people feel that they are 
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caught up in a process of war which is largely beyond their understanding and 
entirely beyond their control – if, indeed, it is within any kind of control (their 
feeling)’. Harrisson connected this powerlessness to the reduction in ‘voluntary 
choice’ by the state, increasing ‘compulsion’ in everyday life, and ‘uncertainty 
about the future’. He diagnosed that the result was ‘passive citizenship’, and 
advocated for an ‘emotional or dynamically logical urge’ to heighten morale. 106  It 
is possible that such an urge was being played out through rumour. Harrisson’s 
diagnosis is redolent of Shibutani’s claim that rumour functions as a mechanism 
for coping with uncertain situations, where a solution is ill–defined but individuals 
feel obligated to act.107 By circulating rumours, individuals potentially countered 
passivity and apathy by regaining some influence and agency in an alienating and 
limiting environment. This had particular potency in the context of the popular 
perception that the state had eroded democratic freedoms, albeit in pursuit of 
national security and ultimate victory over despotic regimes.  
All such reactions may be read by historians as indicators of the deeper 
emotional landscape of wartime Britain. Reports of rumour circulation in letters 
to the Bureau also reveal individual self–projection, and how self-perception and 
attempts at social positioning intersected with notions of community and 
citizenship.  Harold Nicolson, then Director General at the MoI, was concerned 
about British philosopher Cyril Joad’s declaration that the Haw–Haw effect would 
be felt purely on the ‘untrained mind’.108  Joad’s view was repeated in letters to the 
Bureau. The originator of a Haw–Haw rumour at Holmes Brothers’ precision 
woodworking factory, for example, was described by the firm’s Director as ‘a 
rather simple type of person i.e. unintelligent in the extreme without actually 
being imbecilic’.109 In almost all cases, the identification of a rumour-monger was, 
once again, coupled with a form of disassociation – that the individual reporting 
the rumour was sufficiently intelligent to be able to identify the propagandistic 
nature of the rumour and therefore was impervious to its intended effects. 
Conversations overheard by Mass–Observation in 1940 displayed similar 
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distancing practices, regardless of class or educational achievement: ‘M A 38: “To 
people, unlike myself, who are not accustomed to questioning the correctness of 
supposedly authoritative statements, such as BBC announcements, I realise the 
Voice may have a somewhat disturbing effect’”…  M C 40 “some people have minds 
like blotting paper, will soak up anything. They’re incapable of thinking for 
themselves and believe anything they hear”’.110 Declaring immunity from rumour 
and distinguishing oneself from the ‘vulnerable’ was a means of confirming or 
raising one’s social or intellectual capital, just as admitting listening to Haw–Haw 
held a certain ‘cachet’ once it became publicly acknowledged that the educated 
and politically conscious apparently constituted his core audience.111 Denouncing 
rumour, then, could bring similar cognitive rewards to the process of reporting or 
transmitting rumour in the form of individual ‘prestige enhancement’.112  
 Significantly, assumptions about intellectual capacity were frequently 
connected with gender in descriptions of susceptibility to the broadcasts and to 
the subsequent rumour generation. The BBC radio programme The Ear of Britain’s 
dramatised sequence of a family listening into enemy broadcasts made plain 
men’s ability to process information logically without emotional engagement. In 
one scene, the men wait for the women to depart for the kitchen before tuning in 
to Haw–Haw, so as not to ‘upset them’. The women return to express their fury at 
the presence of the enemy in the living room. The man calmly explains, ‘Funny, 
I’ve noticed that he generally makes women very angry…  A man has a different 
outlook from a woman. His interest is to see what sort of a performance the other 
side’s putting up. He likes to watch out for the mistakes. And at the same time he 
likes to credit where the chap’s been a bit cleverer than usual. Men downplay the 
effect; women consider it serious’. 113   Such a view permeated letters to the 
Ministry and to the BBC. Women were thought to be especially sensitive to the 
subversive broadcasts and more prone to pass on rumours, the BBC’s Glasgow 
                                                        
110 ‘A’ was characterised by M-O as being of higher social class and educational 
achievement and ‘C’ as lower down the scale. Overheard conversations, Mass-
Observation, M-O A TC 74/59–77.  
111 Hamburg Broadcasting Propaganda. Summary of the results of an enquiry 
into the extent and effect of its impact on the British Public during mid-Winter 
1939/40’, Listener Research Section, BBC, 8 March 1940, LR/98, HO 186/313.                                                                                                                                                                   
112 Kapferer, Rumors, p. 53.  
113 The Ear of Britain (BBC, February 1940), 10:11.  
 31 
office pointing to the fact that ‘men… are mixing more in the life of the community, 
and have an answer to most of the subtle propaganda coming from Germany’.114  
This was not an isolated view. Raymond Burns, writing in the Evening News and 
Southern Daily Mail, echoed the male characters in The Ear of Britain, claiming that 
‘women, who are, in the main, utterly incompetent in their approach to politics 
(for the reason that their judgements are governed very largely by emotionalism) 
are those who will be the easier prey of the foreign propagandist’.115 J.J. Craik, 
prospective Conservative Party candidate for North East Leeds, similarly warned 
the Leeds Women’s Conservative Association that they were ‘more open’ to Haw-
Haw propaganda than men, due to ‘wishful thinking, sentimentalism and 
propaganda’.116  
Yet, paradoxically, women were also seen as vulnerable due to their 
increased participation in, rather than alienation from, public life, with large 
groups of women in the workforce creating an environment where rumour was 
perceived to become rife. In his letter to the BBC, the General Manager of CEAG 
Limited, manufacturers of miners’ lamps in Barnsley, noted that ‘rumours of this 
kind, although they can be discounted by sensible people, will I am sure, have 
some effect on young girls’.117 CEAG’s managers were ‘[not at all] concerned about 
the effect [of the rumour that the factory was to be bombed] on people outside, 
but we are concerned about the effect… on girls working in the factory’.118 Letters 
to the authorities adopted an infantalising tone when characterising the 
circulation of rumour among women, alluding to female carelessness and 
stupidity as opposed to male cunning and political manipulation.  
Assumptions as to who was most likely to be spreading rumours extended 
to class. The February 1940 BBC Report on the potential effects of Haw-Haw’s 
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broadcast identified three particularly vulnerable categories, categories that were 
distinctly class-bound: the ‘proletarian in the slums, the middle–class business 
man, and the post-war intellectual’. These categories, claimed the BBC, were ‘most 
likely to be malcontents and here the sociological types are supplemented by 
psychological types’. The proletarian, ‘impulsive [and] revolutionary-minded, 
would find himself defenceless against anti-Semitic propaganda and the promise 
of social revolution, forgetting that this was not the cry of the ‘second or third 
international’. The middle-class listener would seek out assurances that his own 
comfort would be maintained, watching for mention of an ‘increase [in] income 
tax and trade’, while the intellectual would find ideological sympathy with Nazi 
condemnations of British imperialism and the failure of the League of Nations.119  
Frequently, authors asserted their authority as legitimate commentators 
on working-class opinion to press the validity of their claims.  A BBC internal 
memorandum on the effect of subversive broadcasts on the working classes 
emphasised the Tyneside Council of Social Service’s ‘very good opportunities of 
hearing working class (and particularly lower working class) opinion, and they 
have been telling me for some weeks that “Lord Haw-Haw”, from being listened to 
and laughed at as a curiosity, is beginning to have some little influence on not 
inconsiderable numbers’, 120 bolstering an earlier assumption by the Corporation 
that ‘Hamburg becomes progressively more popular with each step down the 
income scale’. 121 Just as women were perceived to be unable to deploy sufficient 
analytical skills to distinguish between information, propaganda and rumour, or 
had not been exposed to the political sphere, so too the working classes were 
deemed to be gullible, narrow-minded and especially vulnerable to passing on 
damaging rumours. One writer contacted the Home Intelligence Division in June 
1940 to recount his activities in tracking the rumours of the ‘working and cottage 
classes, who are extremely parochial in their outlook and whose lives and 
thoughts centre around the immediate district in which they live… [They are] only 
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too prone [to misinterpret events around them, with the result that] rumour 
becomes rife’.122  
Where gender and class coincided, the perceived dangers multiplied 
exponentially.  A letter to Lord Vansittart at the Foreign Office expressed concern 
about the effect of Haw–Haw’s broadcasts ‘among the working classes in this part 
of the country, particularly their women folk. As Manager to a very large firm in 
this City employing over 600 hands, and with over 40 years close contact with the 
working classes, I am appalled at the accumulating and increasing interest taken 
by them in this swine’s broadcasts… Even my own maids and charwomen are 
becoming tainted’.123  Servants had an alarming tendency to spread Haw–Haw’s 
word, wrote Lady Swan to Sir Stephen Tallents, with ‘one of them remark[ing] the 
other day that there was probably something in what he said. And there are 
thousands who, like these maids, listen in daily and find themselves influenced by 
malicious lies’. 124  Just as letters mobilised nationalistic language to assert 
authority, class networks were deployed to catch the ear of those in positions of 
influence. Addressing her observations on Haw–Haw rumours directly to Sir 
Stephen Tallents, the Countess of Harrowby’s letter reminded him that ‘when I 
was a little girl I knew your mother and her family quite well’, before swiftly 
moving on to make suggestions for combatting enemy broadcasts.125  
The letters to the Ministry about the spread of rumours attributed to Haw-
Haw, then, reveal much about the deeper emotions and instinctive behaviours that 
the subversive broadcasts encouraged, and of Britons’ perceptions of one another 
and acknowledged divisions in the community. But rumour may also serve to 
bond communities, as the anthropologist Max Gluckman suggested, by 
‘maintain[ing] the unity, morals and values of existing groups’, especially at times 
when such values are at the heart of national debates regarding the relationship 
between the individual and the state and how such a relationship is to be 
negotiated.126 By adopting this approach to the study of rumour, historians may 
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test ‘the boundaries and bonds of a community’.127  Nowhere was this more visible 
than in prosecution of rumour-mongering in the courts. Law defined civil rights 
and responsibilities, and the public keenly observed how authorities applied the 
law, using moral authority to point to the limitations of the State.   
 
Rumour on Trial 
 
The Bureau’s direct appeal for public assistance not only had the potential 
to tap into the individual desire for precise (and personally beneficial) 
information, it also invited the citizen to become an ‘actor’ in national events 
rather than a passive ‘spectator’. Reports of rumours were frequently met with an 
invitation to assist the State in tracking down rumour-mongers, confronting them 
about their behaviour, or, in serious cases, reporting them to the Police.  The 
Bureau replied to reports by asking individuals to obtain ‘(1) the name and 
address of a first-hand witness; (2) the date, time, wave length of the broadcast on 
which he first heard it; (3) some indication or guidance as to the reliability of the 
witness’. 128  It encouraged reporters to ‘trace the culprits’ and ‘interrogate 
witnesses’. In order to gain cooperation in this task, the Bureau frequently 
deployed the language of responsible citizenship: ‘it would be greatly appreciated 
if you would continue to exercise the steadying influence on public opinion that 
you are obviously doing’;129 ‘we are most grateful when responsible members of 
the public such as yourself cooperate in checking such stories’.130  In this task, the 
Bureau was assisted by appeals by the Press. Even Bill Greig, normally a critic of 
the MoI, entreated members of the Anti-Haw-Haw League to ‘pin down anyone 
who tells you something you have not read in a newspaper. Force him to disclose 
the source of his information. Make him produce a newspaper containing the facts 
he states. If he cannot do so, he is either a traitor or a fool – and a fool can do almost 
as much harm as a traitor’. 131 Although Greig killed off the League following the 
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MoI’s ‘Silent Column’ publicity campaign in July 1940, 132claiming that the League 
had achieved its objective of galvanising the MoI into action, a new wave of 
bombing in December 1940 inspired him to encourage his readers to take 
affirmative action: ‘if anyone tells you that Haw-Haw has threatened your town, 
march him to the nearest policeman and charge him with attempting to 
undermine the morale of the public by spreading false information. He will 
deserve anything he gets’. 133   RIOs also encouraged residents to report ‘wild 
rumours’ to the police, appeals that were frequently repeated in local press.134  
In exceptional cases, the information gleaned from such reports was used 
to prosecute malefactors, and the Bureau played a central role in court.   Bureau 
officials provided evidence from the BBC transcripts implicating individuals in the 
creation of defeatist rumours. Those giving evidence often found it difficult to offer 
precise details. Testifying in a trial of a Bath man accused of spreading the rumour 
that Haw-Haw had promised to bomb the city in May 1942, the Director of the BBC 
Monitoring Service found it ‘particularly difficult… to give evidence owing to the 
rather vague nature of the rumour’,  and he urged the MoI to invest more effort 
into tracing the source. 135  Despite the difficulties associated with such 
prosecutions, the Bureau persisted, since it believed that widely publicised 
‘example’ cases would do more to deter rumour-mongers than exhortations to join 
the ‘Silent Column’.   
There were five major prosecutions directly related to spreading Haw-Haw 
rumours, including that of Sidney Hawkins House. Offenders were charged under 
the General Regulations of the Civil Defence Acts 1939, clause 2A 1 (assisting the 
enemy, or prejudicing public safety, the defence of the realm or the efficient 
prosecution of the war) or 39b (1) (endeavour by means of any false statement, 
false document or false report to influence public opinion (whether in the United 
Kingdom or elsewhere) in a manner likely to be prejudicial to the defence of the 
realm or the efficient prosecution of the war).  A successful conviction resulted in 
a term of penal servitude (from months to life, dependent on the severity of the 
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offence) or a fine or both.  The Act invested considerable powers in the Secretary 
of State, notably the judgement as to whether an act was ‘calculated to foment 
opposition to the prosecution to a successful issue of any war in which His Majesty 
is engaged’.136  
 Techniques used by the Court to make an example of the accused depended 
on the severity of the offence. ARP worker and Senior Fire Watcher Frank Carle of 
Bath was denounced by the Bench as ‘more of a fool than a knave’ after stating that 
he had heard Haw-Haw make threats against the city in the aftermath of the 
Baedeker Raids.137 Carle claimed that he was simply mentioning the matter to 
others to check whether anyone else had heard it and to assuage his own fears. He 
received a £5 fine with £3 3s costs .138  Although Bacup couple John Henry and 
Sarah Elizabeth Riley were acquitted of ‘unlawfully publishing a statement which 
was likely to cause some alarm or despondency’, ‘the Bench said they wanted 
everybody to take the case as a warning. People did not seem to realise the enemy 
was on the doorstep. The best thing was to say nothing’.139  The outcome was more 
severe for Albert Leslie Tuckworth of Handsworth, Birmingham, who was given 
the option of paying £10 in fines or serving 31 days in prison for making a ‘false 
statement to influence public opinion in a manner likely to be prejudicial to the 
Defence of the Realm and the efficient prosecution of the war’. M.P. Pugh for the 
Prosecution denounced Tuckworth as a ‘danger to the community’, while the 
Chairman, George Bryson, said Tuckworth had ‘offended through the vanity of the 
spoken word’ and threatened that ‘further cases of the kind would be met with 
stronger action’.140 The case of Sidney Hawkins House of Mansfield was singled 
out for particularly wide publicity, featuring in Ministry leaflets and in the national 
and local Press. 
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 Despite the Bureau’s hopes, prosecutions had precisely the opposite effect 
than that intended. As with disastrous ‘Silent Column’ campaign, 141 the Bureau 
failed to recognise that the public conflated rumour and gossip. Just as scholars 
find it difficult to distinguish between the two, the MoI seemed to be taking a 
heavy-handed approach to an activity that many regarded as intrinsic to national 
life – the right to complain and gossip, a natural human behaviour fulfilling 
important emotional and psychological needs at a time of crisis. Regional 
Information Officers frequently described public alarm at prosecutions under the 
Civil Defence Act. This was particularly true for so-called ‘example cases’, such as 
that of Sidney Hawkins House.142   
A particular point of contention was the Bureau’s suggestion that rumour-
mongers should be reported to the police.143 This was seen to be disproportionate, 
representing an unwelcome intrusion into private lives. There were limits to state 
authority, especially when that authority conflicted with individuals’ sense of civic 
rights and responsibilities and upset the balance between them. Public reaction to 
prosecutions and the Bureau’s appeals to investigate fellow citizens sketched out 
the limits of public participation in such investigations.  Demands for names and 
addresses of those claimed to be the originators were often met with refusal, an 
act of relative bravery when the interrogator was the accused’s employer, 
although some obviously revelled in the officially sanctioned power that the 
Bureau invested in them to ‘frighten the originator’.144  
Assertions of moral superiority as a citizen by the accuser were 
occasionally met with reminders about the citizen’s right to point to the excesses 
of the state and the authority of the individual within it. Upon receiving the request 
from the Bureau for assistance following her report of rumours in circulation, one 
correspondent, Mrs Collins, explained her reluctance to participate in direct 
interrogations: ‘My first instinct was to take it on for myself, but on second 
thoughts, I realised I have no authority for cross-questioning others. Also I am a 
“foreigner” here, ordinarily resident in London, and thus do not belong to the life 
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of the village’. Mrs Collins’ solution was to ‘have somebody appointed by the 
Ministry of Information living in the district, authorised to investigate each 
rumour, trace it back either to thin air or to its source’. The idea that this action 
may have been excessive was not lost on Mrs Collins: ‘I know it is a Hitlerish, idea 
but we have to out-Hitler Hitler!’ Yet there were limits as to her own involvement 
in the task, implying a moral restriction to personal intervention in the lives of 
others: ‘I do not apply for the job, as I should collapse in horror at the thought of 
it!!’ Like other authors, she was especially keen to distance herself from notions of 
individual gain or reward: ‘So, you see, I am writing in a spirit of indignation and 
a genuine desire to see this evil stemmed, without any gain (monetary or glorious) 
to myself!!’145  
Broader concerns regarding proportional actions against offenders were 
reflected in further correspondence with the Bureau. After an extensive 
investigation within the Ward and Goldenstone electrical engineering plant in 
Manchester in July 1940, the originator of a Haw-Haw rumour was found to be a 
young female record clerk, who had simply made some casual remarks to her co-
workers, possibly in an attempt to allay her own anxieties. The Director and Chief 
Control Officer rejected the suggestion that the matter should be reported to the 
local police, stating that, following ‘a very severe talking to’, ‘the girl’ was in ‘a state 
of abject fear as to what is likely to happen, and we think that she has had 
punishment enough’.146 Evelyn M. Grant wrote to the Ministry to confirm that she 
had ‘threatened to report two people who spread the most outrageous tales – and 
I believe they stopped doing so – but in this last report one poor soul nearly 
collapsed, as she has a small baby – and her husband is in the army’.147  
The public expressed a preference for these matters to be worked out on 
the ground, within the community, and through other means.  As the case of Ward 
and Goldenstone suggests, a sharp, condemnatory word, combined with public 
scolding, was often felt sufficient.  Mrs Collins suggested ‘post[ing] up the result 
[of investigations] in the village, including the names of those responsible for 
                                                        
145 Mrs A. B. Collins to Home Office, marked for Police action, 4 June 1940, INF 
1/265.  
 
146 Letter from Ward and Goldenstone to the Bureau, 10 July 1940, INF 1/ 265.  
147 E.M. Grant to the Minister of Information, 20 November 1940, INF 1/265.  
 39 
spreading it’, an idea that held some popular appeal. An article in the Lancashire 
Daily Post raised the question of whether rumour-mongers ought to be publicly 
shamed: there was a need ‘to punish, to expose the culprits to ridicule and 
contempt, to make gossipers realise that harmful chatter is unpatriotic… The time 
has gone for warnings. The known offenders should be brought to book, and 
made to realise that rumour spreading and scandalous whispering help the 
enemy’.  
 
 
Figure 5: Lancashire Daily Post, 7 June 1940. 
 
A respondent to the article suggested a return to ancient forms of social 
humiliation” ‘public opinion in the old days was expressed through the stocks and 
the pillory’.148  His suggestion prompted the newspaper’s cartoonist to illustrate 
his idea (figure 5).  
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 How rumour-mongers were to be tackled and by whom revealed the 
precarious balance between a popular conception of justice and values and the 
desire for more interventionist policies. While acknowledging the importance of 
the threat of prosecution to regulate behaviour, many preferred to exercise the 
moral pressure of the immediate social circle and the local community rather than 
pursue the matter through the courts, frequently citing the distinctions between 
liberal democratic and authoritarian government. 149   Such evidence supports 
Gluckman’s assertion that rumour functioned as mechanism for articulating and 
cementing community values and prevalent morals, enacted from below rather 
than enforced from above.  
 
* 
 
Debates surrounding the spread of rumour, who was authorised to stop 
this activity, and the community response reveals the wider reach of the politics 
of rumour, opening up questions on the relationship between the individual, the 
local community and the state.  The public was not simply the passive recipient or 
horizontal transmitter of rumour as numerous governments during the war had 
assumed: it was an active partner in the tracking and scotching of rumour, using 
rumour as a means of social communication on matters of concern, to express 
anxiety, fears or hope, or to make sense of the events of the war as a form of 
collective understanding or narrative construction.  Rumour gave agency to 
citizens, and, within the highly-regulated environment of wartime Britain, it 
became a means of asserting control by those who felt powerless, constructing 
explanations that anchored the present, and offering the opportunity to devise 
solutions to national problems. Rumour, as Shibutani identified, is best 
characterised as a form of collective problem solving, an indirect contribution to 
the commonwealth. Such acts could be selfless and in the national interest, but 
were also motivated by more egotistical concerns. The public was adept at 
deploying information regarding rumours for individual gain, self-gratification, 
and prestige enhancement. At the height of summer 1940, information had 
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become a commodity. Rumour was a means of asserting control and power. To 
present oneself as being ‘in-the-know’ was to establish one’s place in the social 
hierarchy and in history. Information was a much sought-after wartime 
commodity, and was at the heart of a transaction between the individual and the 
State: certain kinds of knowledge (such as the rumours in circulation) was shared 
in exchange for information that individuals believed the authorities possessed 
(such as details of raids).  
Recognition that rumour is a dialogue between political and social strata is 
fundamental, offering insights into the dynamics of power and the shifting nature 
of political representation. How government and local communities tackled the 
problem of rumours supposedly emanating from the subversive enemy radio 
broadcasts exposes the tensions between the public’s reliance on the authorities, 
with frequent requests for official intervention, and a deep desire to limit the 
powers of the state, displayed in the unease over public prosecutions for rumour-
mongering.  The Government response had to be proportionate and in line with 
shared liberal democratic values. The public eschewed the excesses of the General 
Regulations of the Civil Defence Act for community self-policing, with social 
humiliation and ostracism as the weapon of choice. Here the bonds of community 
were solidified by collective action against malefactors without the assistance of 
national law or official intervention. But it was a divided community. Rumour 
became a means of consciously or unconsciously expressing or revealing identity 
and how individuals projected the self in relation to others. Public and private 
evaluations of rumour-mongers reinforced rather than broke down some 
barriers. Determining who was responsible for rumours and who was vulnerable 
to them revealed gender and class prejudices. Such prejudices were magnified 
where gender, class, and educational attainment intersected. 
Rumour was a mechanism that allowed for deeper emotional expression, 
particularly emotions –such as fear, anxiety, despondency and despair – that ran 
counter to expected behaviours in wartime. The creation and transmission of 
rumour was the search for stability, certainty and explanations, a means of seeking 
out the ‘truth’, rather than finding it. The pursuit of ‘truth’ and understanding is of 
considerable importance, since it reveals the psychological needs of the nation at 
war. It is unsurprising that rumour peaked at times of crisis and fundamental 
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instability, just as it is unsurprising that those conditions produced a critical 
mistrust of official sources, generated conspiracy theories, and exposed 
vulnerabilities.  But this does not mean that rumour should be defined as a 
pathological condition. Far from it. Rumour is a common human behaviour. In 
many ways, understanding wartime societies as complex emotional communities 
provides a better guide to behaviours than the often superficial and polarised 
readings provided by some public opinion sources. Evaluations of public opinion 
may well operate at the extremes, as Michal Shapira has claimed – simply 
categories of “low” or “high” anxiety’ or simply ‘comparing “myth” with reality”’150 
– and are governed by what an individual feels s/he is able to say in a public arena. 
The latter may be conditional upon patriotic gesture, public performance, or fear 
of social ostracism. If we accept that rumour represents a strategy by which 
agency is sought and that those who pass on rumour do so in order to fulfil a 
psychological need, then rumour offers a means of probing human behaviours, 
motivations, and mentalities. It becomes a creative tool for ‘reconstructing’ past 
mental maps and understanding how societies interpreted the world around 
them.  From 1940, Britain’s Anti-Lies Bureau was interested in who started the 
rumour, but they left a remarkable resource for historians to explore who shares 
it and why, ultimately the more significant and revealing question.  
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